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FOREWORD
Many references to “the war of ideas” have appeared
in defense literature recently. However, few of them
actually shed any light on what wars of ideas are. This
monograph, by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, begins by
classifying several types of wars of ideas. It is important
to note, as the author points out, that physical events,
whether intended or incidental, can play determining
roles in the ways these kinds of conflicts unfold, and
how (or whether) they are resolved. In other words,
because ideas are interpreted subjectively, it is not likely
that opposing parties will “win” each other over by
means of an ideational campaign alone. Moreover, third
parties may consider the actions of the belligerents as
much more important than the collective merits of their
ideas. Thus, while strategic communications remain
essential, we may need to manage our expectations as
far as what we wish them to accomplish, particularly
in the current war of ideas.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the debate on this
timely issue.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Despite widespread emphasis on the importance of
winning the war of ideas in recent strategic literature,
we find few analytical studies of wars of ideas as
such. With that in mind, this monograph offers a brief
examination of four common types of wars of ideas, and
uses that as a basis for analyzing how the United States
and its allies and strategic partners might proceed in
the current war of ideas.
Scoping the Problem. Simply put, a war of ideas
is a clash of visions, concepts, and images, and—
especially—the interpretation of them. They are,
indeed, genuine wars, even though the physical
violence might be minimal, because they serve a
political, socio-cultural, or economic purpose, and
they involve hostile intentions or hostile acts. Wars
of ideas can assume many forms, but they tend to
fall into four general categories (though these are not
necessarily exhaustive): (a) intellectual debates, (b)
ideological wars, (c) wars over religious dogma, and
(d) advertising campaigns. All of them are essentially
about power and influence, just as with wars over
territory and material resources, and their stakes, can
run very high indeed.
Common Wars of Ideas.
Intellectual Debates are disputes in which opposing
sides advance their arguments, support them with
evidence, and endeavor to refute the reasoning and
conclusions of the other. Examples include the ongoing
debate between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life advocates, and
the recent dispute between the theories of “intelligent
design” and evolution.
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Ideological Wars are a clash of broad visions usually
organized around a doctrine, whether secular or
nonsecular. The most popular example of an ideological
conflict is the Cold War, which involved political,
economic, and military competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.
Disputes over Religious Dogma are a form of intellectual debate, but they center on conflicting interpretations of sacred tenets or texts, the access to which can
be, and often is, deliberately restricted or otherwise
limited. Examples include the Sunni-Shiite split within
Islam and Catholicism’s East-West schism.
Advertising Campaigns are contests between
competing producers or vendors for “market share.”
The objective of such campaigns is to persuade
audiences to take desired actions, such as voting for a
particular candidate, visiting a certain place, or buying
a specific product. A classic example is the “Cola Wars”
between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola.
Wars of Ideas: Some Conclusions.
Inconclusive outcomes are not unusual in wars of
ideas. Opposing sides seldom change their positions
based on the introduction of new evidence, or new
ways of evaluating existing evidence. Thus, wars
of ideas are rarely settled on the merits of the ideas
themselves. Instead, they tend to drag on, unless an
event occurs that causes the belligerents to focus their
attention elsewhere.
When conclusive outcomes do occur, they tend
to follow the physical elimination or marginalization
of one side’s key proponents. In other cases, a major
event, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, might
occur that renders one side incapable of continuing the
conflict or campaign.
vi

Thus, physical events, whether designed or
incidental, are in some respects more important to the
course and outcome of a war of ideas than the ideas
themselves.
“The War of Ideas.”
Diverging Approaches? Two diverging schools of
thought exist on how the United States and its partners
should approach the current “war of ideas” with alQaeda and similar groups. The first treats the conflict
as a matter for public diplomacy, defined as the
“conveyance of information across a broad spectrum
to include cultural affairs and political action.”
Accordingly, this view calls for revitalizing the U.S.
Department of State, and reestablishing many of the
traditional tools of statecraft.
The second advocates waging the war of ideas as
a “real war,” wherein the objective is to destroy the
influence and credibility of the opposing ideology, and
neutralize its chief proponents. It calls for continuing
the transformation of the U.S. Department of Defense so
that it can better leverage information-age weapons.
Although each approach has merits, neither is
informed by an understanding of wars of ideas as
such. U.S. strategy for the war of ideas requires a more
precise goal than just improving America’s image.
Winning a popularity contest is far less important than
undermining al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit. The two
aims are certainly related, but eminently separable.
Success in the former does not necessarily equate
to success in the latter; conflating the two aims only
creates confusion.
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Recommendations.
•

•

•

•

•

•

U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must be
more alert to the opportunities and pitfalls
introduced by physical events. For instance, the
successful stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq
would have an extremely positive effect on the
war of ideas, undercutting al- Qaeda’s general
information campaign.
Neither the Department of State’s approach nor
that of the Department of Defense should be
subordinated to the other. Rather, the United
States should pursue both approaches in
parallel.
Both Departments should sponsor studies and
conferences that will explore wars of ideas
in more depth, thereby promoting greater
understanding.
The Joint community should revise its
doctrine concerning information operations, to
include psychological operations and military
deception. The basic assumption underpinning
current doctrine is that information operations
are a subset of support to military operations.
Yet, in some cases, military operations might
need to support information operations.
U.S. doctrine on information operations
must also acknowledge that the “information
environment” is neither neutral nor static.
Disparate cultural and social influences almost
always ensure that diverse audiences will
interpret the same information differently.
The U.S. Army’s new Human Terrain System,
which helps enhance cultural awareness, is an
important step in the right direction and should
be supported.
viii

By developing an understanding of wars of ideas
as a mode of conflict, we can fight the current battle of
ideas more effectively, while at the same time better
prepare ourselves to wage future ones.

ix

WARS OF IDEAS AND THE WAR OF IDEAS
INTRODUCTION
Officials and analysts alike continue to underscore
the importance of the “war of ideas” as an integral
part of the larger war on terror.1 The U.S. National
Security Strategy (March 2006) declares that “From the
beginning,” the war on terror “has been both a battle of
arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists
and their murderous ideology.”2 Likewise, the U.S.
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September
2006) states that “In the long run, winning the War on
Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”3 Similarly,
the newly released U.S. National Strategy for Homeland
Security (October 2007) affirms that “the War on Terror
is a different kind of war—not only a battle of arms but
also a battle of ideas.”4 In addition, Stephen Hadley,
President Bush’s National Security Advisor, recently
explained:
. . . what we need to do as a nation is come together and
put in place the tools we need both to wage the operational war and also to wage the war of ideas. . . . We
need to fight this enemy operationally, we need to fight
it ideologically, in terms of our values and principles
and alternative vision.5

Although the importance of the war of ideas is
broadly recognized, many analysts warn that the
United States is losing that war.6 As we shall see, these
concerns are partly the result of conflating the war
of ideas with the popularity (or, more accurately, the
unpopularity) of some U.S. policies, and of America’s
image abroad. Interestingly, the United States does not
appear to be losing the war of ideas on the home front.
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Polls taken by the Pew Research Center show that
the “overwhelming majority of American Muslims
reject terrorism and religious extremism,” and hold
“a positive view of American society,” despite the
fact that “more than half say it is more difficult to
be Muslim” since September 11, 2001 (9/11).7 The
tendency to roll general attitudes of anti-Americanism
under the rubric of the war of ideas is justified only to
a limited extent, and only because our adversaries will
try to exploit those attitudes.8 It is not helpful to link
general negative opinions about the United States to a
failure in the war of ideas. The stated policy aim in this
battle of ideas is, after all, to “prevent the emergence
of violent Islamic radicalization in order to deny
terrorists future recruits and [to] defeat homegrown
extremism.”9 Dissatisfaction with certain U.S. policies
does not necessarily equate to support for a global
jihad. Some anti-American sentiments existed well
before, and quite independently, of the war on terror;
and many of them will undoubtedly persist for some
time in the future, regardless of how the conflict ends.
Despite this widespread emphasis on winning the
war of ideas, we find almost no analyses of such wars
in today’s voluminous strategic literature. At present,
we have a wealth of studies addressing all forms of
conventional and unconventional wars, particularly
insurgencies. Yet, we find precious few addressing
wars of ideas. This dearth is particularly unfortunate
given that more than 6 years have elapsed since 9/11.10
Indeed, various battles of ideas are taking place at any
given time.
Hence, an analytical study of wars of ideas, to the
extent they are wars, would enhance our understanding
of such conflicts and how we might approach them.
With that in mind, this monograph, which is necessarily
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limited in scope, does two things. First, it offers a brief
examination of what appear to be the four basic types
of wars of ideas found in history. Second, it uses that
examination as a start point for analyzing the principal
approaches in the current war of ideas. Just as we
would do well to understand the nature of any armed
conflict we intend to fight before embarking upon it,
so, too, we ought to appreciate the nature of any war
of ideas we might attempt to wage.11
Scoping the Problem.
Simply put, a war of ideas is a clash of visions, concepts, and images, and—especially—the interpretation
of them; for the images themselves matter much less
than the way they are perceived. They are, indeed,
genuine wars because they serve a purpose, usually
political, social, or economic in nature, and they involve
hostile intentions or hostile acts, though they are not
always physically violent.12 History suggests wars of
ideas fall into four general categories: (a) intellectual
debates, (b) ideological wars, (c) wars over religious
dogma, and (d) advertising campaigns. All of them
are essentially about power and influence, just as with
wars over territory and material resources, and their
stakes can run quite high. In fact, many wars of ideas
occur as part of larger physical conflicts. One of the
principal motives for a war of ideas is fear that others
will gain access to, or control of, some form of physical
power or material wealth. In some cases, ideas are the
most effective weapons for countering such threats.
Nearly every war has an ideational component, but
in some conflicts that component plays secondary role.
As history shows, propaganda and patriotic rhetoric
often escalate into a war of words and images, a battle
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of ideas of sorts. Such battles help boost morale and
generate material contributions and other support for
the physical fighting. Yet, it is not necessary to win
such battles to win a physical clash of arms. In the
Second World War, for instance, the rhetoric used by
the Allies and the Axis powers portrayed the conflict
as an all-out struggle between “good and evil.”13
However, the ideational struggle was settled on the
battlefield, with the physical defeat of Axis forces in
Europe and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan.
This physical success helped discredit Nazism and
Japanese imperialism, except of course in the eyes of
fanatics. The physical presence of military forces during
reconstruction enabled the Allies to control people and
places, and thereby remove, rehabilitate, or reeducate
subject populations.14
It is important to note the difference between wars
in which ideas are used mainly to support a physical
clash of arms, and others where ideas are either the casus
belli or the principal weapons. Both types of conflicts
are, strictly speaking, wars of ideas. In the former,
however, military power initially plays a leading role
by defeating an opponent’s armed might, then shifts
to a secondary, yet still important role by providing
security during reconstruction. In the latter, military
power may play only a limited role or perhaps none at
all. As noted earlier, U.S. officials see the current war on
terror as a combined effort, involving both physical and
ideational elements, with the latter more important, if
not decisive, than the former. This emphasis suggests
that the United States sees itself as engaged in the
second type of wars of ideas, where physical force plays
a supporting role. However, that is not to say that the
use of military force is not important in this conflict, or
that there is not a relationship between it and success
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and failure in the war of ideas. On the contrary, as the
following survey reveals, physical events, to include
those brought about by the use of (kinetic) force,
often play a critical role in resolving wars of ideas or
marginalizing the opposition.
PRINCIPAL WARS OF IDEAS
Intellectual Debates.
An intellectual debate is a relatively common and
long-standing form of a war of ideas. We will define it
here as any dispute in which opposing sides advance
arguments, support them with evidence of some kind,
and endeavor to refute the reasoning and conclusions
of the other. Not surprisingly, such debates range from
the trivial to the consequential. An example of the
former might be the various interpretations of literary
works by scholars and other critics, particularly those
who adhere to some of the tenets of post-structuralism,
such as the assertion that we can never know for certain
what an author intended to say so we should exclude
authorial intent altogether.15 In contrast, the ongoing
debate between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life advocates
has raised momentous legal, ethical, and moral issues;
a number of doctors and medical personnel lost their
lives in the process.16 The debate was well under way
even before the case of Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme
Court decision that upheld abortion as a constitutional
right.17 An example of an intellectual debate that falls
somewhere between trivial and consequential is the
controversy over whether the military revolution that
purportedly took place in early modern Europe was
more of an evolution than a revolution, or whether
it was actually a series of punctuated equilibria.18

5

Regardless of how we choose to answer this question,
the consequential part of the military revolution is how
it transformed power relationships both within Europe,
and beyond it, at the time (of course, this effect, too, is
debatable).
Ostensibly, intellectual debates hinge on the
nature and quantity of evidence available, and the
interpretations or conclusions we can reasonably
draw from that evidence. In theory, debates involve
an objective evaluation of available facts, such as
they are, and the participants purportedly revise
their positions as new information becomes available.
However, as Thomas Kuhn has shown, intellectual
debates turn as much on the power structures involved
in the controversy and what they stand to lose by
supporting a particular point of view as much as—or
perhaps even more—than they do on the available
evidence.19 Similarly, Sir Karl Popper’s seminal work
on “objective” knowledge reveals that what we know,
even if developed via the scientific method, is never
wholly certain; knowledge is fluid, and the process
of knowing is dynamic, affected as much by our
underlying assumptions as our imperfect ability to
identify and examine those assumptions.20 In short,
people from different cultures and backgrounds do
not necessarily give an equal amount of credence to
the same kinds of evidence.
The recent dispute between the theories of
“intelligent design” and evolution is a case in point.21
Proponents of the former maintain that Darwin’s
theory of natural selection, which is the intellectual
foundation for the modern theory of evolution, does
not explain the origin of complex forms of life; hence,
it is quite likely that some higher intelligence designed
them. Opponents of intelligent design counter that this
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theory is merely “creationism” in another guise. U.S.
District Judge John E. Jones III ultimately ruled that
the insertion of the theory of intelligent design into the
science curriculum of the Dover Area School District
(in Pennsylvania) violated the separation of church
and state.22
Other examples include controversies caused first
by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) and later by Galileo
Galilei (1564-1642) when they advanced heliocentric, or
sun-centered, models of the universe.23 These models
challenged the Ptolemaic, or geocentric model, which
placed the earth at the center of the universe, and had
obvious implications beyond the narrow interests
of mathematical astronomy. If the earth was not, in
fact, the center of the universe, as sacred texts were
purported to have stated, what then was to be made
of scriptural authority? In essence, these controversies
had as much to do with interpretive authority as with
the inadequacies of the geo-centric model, which were
already known to many scholars and clerics. In truth,
the heliocentric model only undermined literalist
interpretations of Christian scripture, an understanding
many religious authorities—to include Augustine of
Hippo (354-430)—had long cautioned against.
Actually, Copernicus’ work was preceded by that of
other students of the stars, to include several Catholic
clergymen and Muslim scholars, who had developed
computational models which, by implication at least,
suggested that the sun was the center of the universe.
Nonetheless, Copernicus’ astronomical tables were
much more extensive than those of his predecessors,
enabling the computation of past as well as future
positions of the stars and planets. This predictive
quality moved helio-centrism from the category of
simple speculation, or hypothesis, to a defensible
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theory. The theory was subsequently defended by
several astronomers, to include Johannes Kepler
(1571-1630) and more famously, Galileo.
This debate was only one of many for Galileo,
however. He was also engaged in arguments with other
astronomers, including a number of Jesuit scholars,
about the nature of sunspots, comets, and science
itself.24 Unfortunately, none of the participants in these
debates were above inserting a gratuitous ad hominem
or two in their works to belittle their opponents; such
actions quickly and predictably drove the dispute
beyond the dialectical quest for knowledge into the
baser realm of personal “score-settling.” Even more
unfortunately, the timing of Copernicus’ and Galileo’s
scientific endeavors coincided with the gathering
momentum of the Inquisition and the Thirty Years’
War (1618-48), which had made the Catholic Church
sensitive to scriptural challenges, direct or implied.
Many Church officials, to include Pope Urban III,
originally an admirer of Galileo, acknowledged the
data supporting the heliocentric model, but cautioned
against advocating it as a replacement for the geocentric
model, which was also the conventional wisdom even
among secular scholars. Evidently, when Galileo
published his famous work, Dialogue Concerning the
Two Chief World Systems, he thought he had complied
with Urban’s wishes to avoid advocacy. However, the
Church saw the work differently. In 1638, Galileo was
brought before the Inquisition on the charge of heresy.
The tribunal ordered him to recant, which he refused
to do. He was subsequently found guilty and placed
under comfortable house arrest where he remained
until his death in 1642. According to most historians,
he was condemned more for defying papal authority
than for the scientific, if flawed, model he advanced.
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Such muddled outcomes are typical of intellectual
disputes. Proponents on each side are rarely persuaded
to change their positions by the introduction of new
evidence, or new ways of evaluating the evidence.
Instead, they tend to remain entrenched in their
positions, convinced of the correctness of their own
interpretations, and resolved to carry on the fight in
another form, or in another setting, or with different
tactics, rather than conceding. Arbitration may have to
come from an outside authority, but that decision—as in
the example of the debate over Intelligent Design—may
only limit the formal jurisdiction of the theory or idea,
not its appeal or its informal influence. In some cases,
intransigence might have little to do with the evidence,
which might be persuasive, and more to do with the
political repercussions of conceding. It was not until
centuries later that the Catholic Church apologized
for condemning Galileo. However, it insists, probably
rightly, that its rejection of the heliocentric model was
correct based on the scientific standards of proof at the
time; Galileo, for instance, could not account for the lack
of parallax shifts in the stars’ positions, a phenomenon
which must occur if the earth moved about the sun.25
So, while Galileo showed that the Ptolemaic model
was inadequate, which many already believed, he was
not entirely persuasive with regard to his own model.
At first glance, the stakes involved in intellectual
debates might not seem particularly high. A scholar
advancing a controversial interpretation of the
significance of one of Shakespeare’s works, for instance,
may be denied tenure at an intellectual institution on
the basis of his or her views (among other factors).
Yet, should that concern the general population? To
be sure, such consequences might not impress those
outside academia. However, a lack of intellectual
diversity in institutions of higher learning can lead
9

to rigid orthodoxies concerning what is taught at
that level, as well as other levels of education. Many
scholars promoted racist, Social Darwinist doctrines in
Western educational curricula during the 19th century,
with disastrous consequences for later generations.26
Thus, the outcomes of intellectual debates can be quite
momentous. Likewise, a judge’s stand on Roe v. Wade
could affect whether he or she is confirmed for a seat on
the Supreme Court, the rulings of which can obviously
prove widely and profoundly influential.
In several of the cases mentioned above, an external
event—the decision of a judge or a court—decided the
issue. While some assume that such authorities are
unbiased and impartial, that is not necessarily true, and
it was clearly not true in the case of Galileo. Nonetheless,
the decisions above had only limited influence.
The debate over the heliocentric system resurfaced
later; similarly, the disputes involving evolution and
creationism, and those regarding abortion tend to
resurface periodically. Other intellectual debates, such
as the causes of the French Revolution or of World War
I, continue, sometimes with new schools of thought
emerging, or old ones trying new perspectives or
uncovering new evidence. It would also be inaccurate
to say that such debates have no strategic aims, as
many of them, such as those pertaining to the causes of
the French Revolution, are part of a larger ideological
struggle.
Disputes over Religious Dogma.
Disputes over religious dogma are similar to
intellectual debates in the sense that the proponents
tend to adhere doggedly to their own points of view.
The key difference, however, is that the evidentiary

10

support for battles over religious dogma generally
centers on the interpretation of sacred texts, the access
to which can be, and often is, deliberately restricted or
otherwise limited. Complicating the issue, of course,
is that many sacred texts have been forged or falsified,
while many others have been lost or may never, in fact,
have existed.27 Logic and rigorous analysis, then, can
carry the debate only so far. Beyond that, one must
make the proverbial leap of faith.
A case in point is the dispute between Augustine
of Hippo, the renowned bishop whom the Catholic
Church later canonized, and the ascetic monk
Pelagius (354-420). At root, the controversy centered
on two different views of human nature, which in
turn had momentous implications for the traditional
understanding of the nature of original sin and the
means of salvation. Pelagius believed human beings
had the ability to choose, and therefore could choose
right over wrong. Because of this capacity for selfdetermination, humans and their societies were
perfectible: progress was possible through right
choices. Although Augustine laid down similar views
in his early writings regarding the human ability to
choose (particularly in his Confessions), he later came
to reject the Pelagian idea of self-determination. For
Augustine, human beings had unconscious urges or
feelings which they could not simply choose to not have
(a matter with which he had considerable experience).
Since these feelings could not be eliminated by choice
alone, they required the healing powers of baptism,
to absolve one first of original sin, and divine grace,
to cleanse one of subsequent sin. Humans could only
realize free will and self-determination at the end of
a long spiritual healing process by which feelings
and the intellect were brought together in union.28 To
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summarize the contrast, Pelagius held that human
nature was essentially good, though far from perfect,
and that God had already given it the intellectual and
spiritual tools necessary for its salvation. Humans had
but to choose to apply those tools correctly. Augustine,
on the other hand, maintained that humans could not
choose not to be humans, and that they are, by their
nature, weak and sinful; ergo, humans could not be
counted on to choose well, absent the intervention of
divine grace.29
Significantly, Augustine’s refutation of Pelagius,
and its subsequent acceptance by the Catholic Church’s
engaged but rather deferential clergy, contributed to
preserving the Church’s assumed role as humanity’s
spiritual leader and healer. Although Pelagius and
his followers appear to have been more interested in
reforming human social behavior, which they saw
as morally lax, than in setting forth a new religious
dogma, Augustine saw their ideas as a threat to the
Church’s authority and influence, and repeatedly
portrayed them as such.
Notably, each side of the controversy had extensive
networks of followers and supporters: Pelagius’ were
located primarily in Britain and Sicily, while Augustine’s
were found predominantly in Rome and Africa. Several
councils met (two in 415 and one each in 416 and 418)
to determine whether Pelagius’ beliefs were in accord
with Church dogma. Augustine’s voluminous and
detailed arguments had exposed other heresies, and
had duly established him as an authority on matters of
dogma. In 418, he held a council in Hippo that issued
a condemnation of Pelagius’ teachings based on nine
points which, Augustine correctly demonstrated,
directly contradicted Church dogma. Augustine sent
the condemnation to Pope Zosimus, strongly urging the
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Pope to agree.30 Zosimus consented, and Pelagius was
exiled from Rome. He is believed to have died shortly
thereafter, in 420, though that remains unconfirmed.
Moreover, the circumstances of his death are not clear:
some accounts claim he was killed by members of
the Catholic Church who feared he might continue
preaching; again, none of that has been substantiated.
Indeed, Pelagius’ ideas, which appear to have been a
blend of Celtic individualism and Greek stoicism, have
persisted in Christian literature, though in diffused
form. Even today, we find the idea of self-determination
at the root of any number of modern ideologies and
doctrines.
Not surprisingly, the stakes in this dispute ran
high. After all, a dominant interpretation of dogma can
shape what the members of a particular faith believe
for many ages to come. The tenets or principles which
comprise religious dogma define not only this life,
what it means and how to behave in it, but also the
afterlife, what it is, and who shall have it. Augustine
obviously understood the stakes, even if some of his
fellow bishops did not. Other, perhaps better known
and certainly more consequential examples of disputes
over religious dogma include the Sunni-Shiite split
within Islam and Catholicism’s East-West schism. Each
of these disputes involved different interpretations of
dogma, as well as overlapping political, economic, and
cultural issues.
In this example, a physical event—the Pope’s
decision to exile Pelagius and his resultant departure
from the scene—played a key role in resolving the
debate. Except for Augustine’s and Pelagius’ followers,
other members of the clergy appear to have been
ambivalent. Perhaps not as well-steeped in church
dogma as Augustine, they failed to perceive Pelagius’
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teachings as a threat. It took Augustine’s persistent
orchestrations and his detailed comparison between
Pelagius’ writings and church dogma to move Zosimus
to action. That action proved decisive. Again, we can
say that this resolution was only a temporary one in
the larger picture, however. The debate over human
nature has been taken up by many philosophers and
theologians since, and remains essentially unresolved.
Ideological Wars.
For purposes of this monograph, an ideology is
any organized set of political or philosophical ideas,
whether secular or nonsecular. An ideological war
differs from a dispute over religious dogma in that the
latter involves a disagreement over the interpretation
of sacred texts, with the opposing views emerging
from within the same religion. Ideological contests, in
contrast, often cross secular and nonsecular lines.
Some scholars argue that religious beliefs and
ideologies are qualitatively different because the
former are more powerful motivators than the
latter.31 However, making such a distinction seems
unnecessary. Religions and ideologies each have their
articles of faith; both rely on underlying assumptions
that seldom hold up well to rigorous scrutiny. Just as
with religion, the principal proponents of an ideology
are likely to remain faithful despite an absence of
positive proof for their views, and in the face of
contrary evidence. Indeed, ideologues, by definition,
claim access to a higher source of knowledge which, for
them, requires no proof. To be sure, religious beliefs,
especially those associated with achieving a place in,
or defining, the afterlife, have prompted people to
take extreme measures. Such religious concerns were
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among the many motives for the Thirty Years’ War
that ravaged Europe. However, those concerns were
also inextricably bound up with some very secular
political and material motives. Moreover, it is difficult
to conceive of any measures more extreme than those
associated with Adolph Hitler’s Holocaust. Joseph
Stalin and Mao Zedong also purportedly killed tens of
millions of people in the furtherance of their ideological
goals. We have little reason, then, for maintaining that
nonsecular ideologies are necessarily different from
secular ones on the grounds that the former are more
destructive than the latter.32
The most familiar example of an ideological war is,
of course, the Cold War, where the political, economic,
and military competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union and their allies played out in
an ideational realm as well.33 While the Cold War is
considered to have begun at the end of World War II,
its roots surely trace back to the Russian Revolution of
1917, which strained relations between the United States
and the emerging Soviet Union (which, incidentally,
the United States did not recognize until 1933). The
antipathy between the two competing ideologies—
Marxism-Leninism and Western-style capitalism—
began in the mid-19th century, and grew in intensity
through the 20th century.
The post-World War II era saw massive propaganda
efforts deployed by both sides in an attempt to win
the battle of ideas between competing political and
economic philosophies.34 This ideational war was fought
in classrooms and on college campuses, in journals and
books, and in radio broadcasts, television programs,
and the silver screen, and, of course, in the courts, and
it involved the use of a plethora of catchwords and
images. Both sides also exploited international sporting
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and other competitive events, such as the Olympics
or the World Chess Championships, for propaganda
purposes. Far from a contest between the merits and
demerits of the theories propounded by Adam Smith
or Karl Marx, this ideational struggle often took on a
powerful emotional dimension: the pluck and grit of
amateur athletes, such as the U.S. Hockey team which
accomplished the famous “Miracle on Ice” against
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) stategroomed powerhouse of semi-professionals in 1980;
or the eccentric and troubled genius of Bobby Fischer
defeating the methodical brilliance of Boris Spassky at
the World Chess Championship of 1972.35
For the United States and its allies, much Cold War
propaganda emphasized success stories, especially
those well-suited to a David-versus-Goliath theme.
However, there was also a dark, and patently selfdestructive, side to the ideological war against
communism that both succumbed to, and fostered, an
insidious civic paranoia. The “McCarthyism” of the
late 1940s and 1950s, for instance, ruined the lives of
many loyal Americans, and often did so on little more
than unfounded suspicions, or for the sake of political
opportunism.36 The use of “loyalty review boards” and
other interrogational institutions that went hand-inhand with McCarthyism may seem like extreme measures, but they are by no means unique as weapons in
wars of ideas. Christendom’s religious inquisitions,
which ran from the 12th through the 19th centuries,
were, in essence, loyalty review boards, but on a grander scale.
History recognizes four major inquisitions. Scholars
generally refer to the first as the medieval inquisition,
which was a combination of the largely ineffective
episcopal inquisition, begun in 1184, and the much more

16

efficient papal inquisition, initiated by Pope Gregory
IX in the 1230s, and carried out with the support of
the Dominican order. The second is referred to as the
Spanish Inquisition, which began in 1478 at the behest
of monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, and was not
officially ended until 1834, though in practice it had
faded much earlier. The third inquisition began in 1536
at the direction of King Joao III of Portugal, and is thus
referred to as the Portuguese Inquisition. The fourth or
Roman inquisition, which was designed to combat the
spread of Protestantism in Italy, commenced in 1542 at
the order of Pope Paul III, and lasted until the middle
of the 18th century.37 Collectively, the inquisitions were
as much political instruments as they were religious,
and the motives for them were as materiel as they
were ideational. Their explicit purpose was to ensure
that recent converts to Christianity were earnest:
many converts apparently did so primarily to avoid
persecution and expulsion. However, there were clear
economic and political motives behind the Inquisition
as well, since many of those accused were wealthy or
had political enemies. While much has been made of
the inquisitions’ use of torture and executions, recent
scholarship has challenged those views.38 In fact, the
inquisitors gained more by showing mercy and by
obtaining confessions than by burning people at the
stake. Victory was defined in terms of the number
of souls saved through confessions; in contrast, an
execution meant a defeat, for it was a failure to save a
soul.
Many analysts today advocate using the Cold
War model for the war of ideas in the current war on
terror.39 The model has much to recommend it. The
Cold War lasted several generations and involved
multiple dimensions (political, economic, military,
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and cultural). However, in other respects, the model
is not useful. The Soviet Union was an explicitly
defined political-geographic entity, which could be
targeted militarily and physically contained, though,
to be sure, its ideology of revolution was not limited
by physical boundaries. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups naturally need to occupy physical space and
are clearly political entities in their own right, albeit
with a religiously zealous, anti-Western core; however,
they are not geographically identifiable in the same
sense, though al- Qaeda’s largest base appears to be
in the mountains of Pakistan.40 More significantly,
the decisive event in the war against communist
ideology was the economic collapse of the Soviet
Union.41 To be sure, part of that collapse was due to
the West’s strategy of containment and the fact that it
was carried out against fundamentally flawed Soviet
economic practices during the post-World War II arms
race. However, neither of these causes can be directly
attributed to the war of ideas, the propaganda battle
between Moscow and the West.
Moreover, a fundamental problem with the Cold
War model is that it is essentially impossible to wage
an economic war against al- Qaeda and its affiliates,
or to pursue a strategy of containment, without at the
same time harming Muslim states and populations
whom we do not want to harm. In addition, it is not
clear that the propaganda war that raged between
the Western allies and the USSR actually convinced
people to believe anything they did not already wish
to believe, or had been conditioned to believe. Those
indoctrinated in a particular system do not appear
especially receptive to propaganda from the other
side, unless they have ulterior motives. If they turn
against their own side, as in the case of the ex-Federal
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) spy Robert Hanssen, they
often appear to do so for reasons which have little to
do with ideology.42 Without reliable data, it is difficult
to draw defensible conclusions about the effectiveness
of propaganda efforts on target populations which are
already intellectually and emotionally committed to
another cause. Undecided minds are another matter.
Hence, if one party is waging a concerted information
campaign, the other can hardly avoid doing likewise.
Silence suggests weakness, guilt, or both.
The ideological wars referred to above were
resolved either by a major physical event, such as the
collapse of the Soviet Union, or by other kinds of force.
The inquisitions detained individuals by force, and
extracted confessions, again usually by physical or
emotional force. This was also true of McCarthy’s more
secular brand of inquisition. That Hitler, Stalin, and
Mao used force in their ideological struggles is patently
obvious, though one would expect that when ideas are
used to support military action. This is not to say that
propaganda in the form of leaflets, radio broadcasts,
and the like, are not effective in getting opponents to
surrender or that they have no value. Rather, it is easy
to overlook the amount and type of psychological or
emotional force they can bring to bear.
Advertising Campaigns.
Advertising campaigns are arguably the most
pervasive, and thus the most common, wars of ideas.
An advertising campaign is a series of messages, often
packaged as sound-bites or slogans, carrying a central
idea about a person, place, or a thing. The objective of
the campaign, of course, is to get the audience to take a
desired action, to vote for a particular candidate, to visit
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a certain place, or to buy a specific product. According
to one source, some of the most successful advertising
campaigns in the United States include: Nike, “Just
Do It” (1988); Miller Lite, “Tastes great, less filling”
(1974); Avis, “We try harder” (1963); Maxwell House,
“Good to the last drop” (1959); U.S. Army, “Be all that
you can be” (1981); and Burger King, “Have it your
way” (1973).43 With but few exceptions, many of these
slogans are still in use, which is obviously evidence of
their effectiveness.
Stakes in this sort of war of ideas are relatively high,
from the political success of a candidate to an increase
in market share for a manufacturer or a vendor. A
classic example is the ongoing war of slogans and
images between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. Each uses
a combination of slogans, images, and celebrities in an
attempt to convince consumers that its product tastes
better and is more refreshing. These “Cola Wars”
have raged for several decades, with each producer
developing new flavors and marketing strategies.
The most important of these was Coca-Cola’s effort
to provide a cheap and steady supply of bottled Coke
to men and women serving in the military during
World War II. This strategy resulted in millions of
servicemen and women returning to the United States
with an acquired taste for Coca-Cola, and in a global
bottling and distribution network. Another notable
marketing move was Coca-Cola’s use of the song, “I’d
like to teach the world to sing . . .” in the early 1970s;
the song, connected with images of people of all races
and nationalities joining hand-in-hand, proved an
instant success, offering hope in politically uncertain
times. Another success, the “Pepsi Challenge,” was
initiated by Pepsi-Cola in 1975, in which individuals
took blind taste-tests and selected the product they
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preferred. Pepsi was purportedly chosen a majority
of the time. Yet, while Pepsi’s sales increased through
this and other clever strategies, it has never been able
to overtake Coke in terms of market share. The CocaCola logo has become associated internationally with
all things American, good and bad. In 2006, CocaCola products still held 43 percent of the market share
for carbonated soft drinks in the United States, while
Pepsi-Cola products held 31 percent.44
Advertising campaigns must continue as long
as a product can be expected to be sold for a profit,
or a candidate is running for office. To be sure, the
campaigns themselves evolve (or devolve) over time,
responding to changing situations and to actions taken
by the competition. However, they retain their basic
characteristic, which is the intrinsic drive for larger
market share, whether that consists of consumers
or voters. Significantly, Coca-Cola’s relative edge
over Pepsi-Cola has as much to do with the former’s
aggressive exploitation of physical events unrelated to
the taste of its products, such as military deployments
overseas, world sporting events such as the Olympics,
and providing a message of hope in troubled times.
WARS OF IDEAS: SOME CONCLUSIONS
This brief discussion of wars of ideas reveals, first
of all, that they do not occur in isolation from physical
events, but rather turn on them. Physically eliminating,
driving away, or otherwise neutralizing a party’s key
proponents is only one, albeit the most obvious, way to
resolve such a conflict. Augustine leveraged the power
of the pope to achieve such an outcome in the battle
with Pelagius. As the example of the collapse of the
Soviet Union shows, a major event—such as an internal
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coup, economic collapse, or natural disaster—can also
bring about the demise of one party, or its credibility,
and thus resolve or at least marginalize a war of ideas.
Deliberately connecting a negative event to a “failed”
set of ideas is thus another way to gain an important
advantage in a conflict. It might not matter that the
connection does not hold up to close scrutiny; the
audience might not require a high standard of proof
if the outcome is desirable. The West was eager to
believe, albeit with some justification, the explanation
that the Soviet Union collapsed because the strategy of
containment worked. To be sure, socialism has hardly
been extinguished as a school of thought. Still, the
failure of the Soviet experiment seriously compromised
the ideology’s basic tenets, and it is now much less
powerful.
It is unlikely that the inquisitions of the Catholic
church or the loyalty review boards of McCarthy would
have been taken seriously without some legal, moral,
or physical force to back them. At the same time, it is
not clear that any “confessions” extracted by the threat
of force have ever been truly reliable. While force can
play an important role in any battle of ideas, it can also
lead to results that are superficial or counterproductive.
Of course, that raises the question as to whether the
“confession” was the ultimate purpose, or whether the
war of ideas was only intended to support the use of
force in the first place.
The survey also suggests that wars of ideas can
fade into irrelevance for at least some period of time.
Participants might have their interests taken up by
other matters, perhaps another debate or a catastrophic
physical event. Or, the next generation might have
different tastes and concerns, and thus might not
consider a particular battle of ideas worth its time. It is,
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to be sure, to avoid such outcomes that advertising and
recruiting campaigns transform themselves to ensure
that they retain their appeal in ever changing markets.
Yet, such efforts must run continuously, and should
involve extensive market research.
Many wars of ideas will continue indefinitely,
evolving into different forms with varying intensities,
to be fought out by later generations. The debates
between Pro-Life and Pro-Choice constituencies have
raged for decades, and will likely continue for decades
more.45 New evidence may be presented, or new tactics
tried, but at root, this debate will involve many of the
same issues for years. Similarly, we could make a
case that the battle between Augustine and Pelagius
represents but a single episode in a longer dispute
over contrasting views of human nature. None of this,
of course, mattered to either Augustine or Pelagius at
the time. In short, the old adage is true that ideas—like
diseases—never really die, only the vectors do.
“The War of Ideas.”
The battle of ideas in the war on terror is a complex
mixture of two types of conflicts, one external and the
other internal. Externally, this war is an ideological
struggle between the West, and in particular the United
States, and terrorist groups, especially al- Qaeda and
its spin-offs. The aim of the United States is to render
al- Qaeda a negligible threat. For al-Qaeda, it is an
effort to undermine the West’s support for moderate
Islamic regimes, and to prevent its secular ways from
corrupting Islam. To be sure, the ideas at odds here
vary among those participating in, or describing, the
conflict.46 That is to be expected in a battle of ideas, since
competing parties will often use otherwise unrelated
images, concepts, and slogans to support their causes.
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Internally, this war is a battle over religious dogma
within Islam. It is a struggle to establish a particularly
militant interpretation of the Koran and of shari’a law,
which would mobilize Muslims against the West, and
thus lead to the purification of Islamic society and
resurrect the greatness of the Caliphate.
As Akbar Ahmed, a Muslim scholar who holds
the Chair of Islamic Studies at American University,
explains:
Properly understood, this is a war of ideas within Islam—
some of them faithful to authentic Islam, but some of
them clearly un-Islamic and even blasphemous toward
the peaceful and compassionate Allah of the Qur’an.47

Other Islamic scholars and Muslim organizations
have agreed, some explicitly condemning bin Laden
as an “apostate.”48 In addition, some Muslim leaders
have openly denounced the threat Takfiri and Salafi
jihadism poses:
[Saudi youth have become] a tool in the hands of foreign forces that manipulate them in the name of jihad,
whilst fulfilling their shameful goals and objectives in
foul operations that are far removed from religion so
that our youth have become a commodity to be bought
and sold.49
Either we will have in the next 10 years 80 million productive young people . . . or we will have 80 million radical extremists in the Middle East.50

In addition, other Muslim authorities have
challenged key al- Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman alZawahiri, to debate religious issues.51 The internal
struggle is one that only Muslims can wage; nonMuslims may assist in some ways, when asked, but
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they surely have no authority—and, thus, no right—to
opine on matters of dogma. The quotes above suggest
that Islam is in the midst of a revivalist or reformationcounter-reformation dynamic that will have to run its
course.
In contrast, the external struggle involves both
Muslims and non-Muslims; the tactics of these selfstyled Takfiri or Salafist jihadis virtually ensure that.
So, the central question for American policymakers
becomes how the United States and its strategic
partners might wage the external ideological battle
without unnecessarily complicating Islam’s internal
struggle. Revivalist movements have come and gone
throughout history, with most lasting but a few
decades, and the more violent ones less than that.
It is possible, then, that the so-called Salafi jihadi
movement will also eventually burn itself out, even
if a small core of zealots manages to survive.52 Just
as some wars of ideas end when people lose interest
in them, so Muslim youths might also lose interest in
this movement, seeing it as the dead-end it literally is,
and turn their minds and bodies toward more fruitful
endeavors. Indeed, as some scholars have pointed out,
the “future of the region belongs to young Muslims,”
and, thus, the United States would do well to consider
how its policies and actions will affect them.53
Of course, the motives in each of these conflicts
are more than ideological. One former terrorist
confessed that he found the idea of a quick and sure
path to paradise via martyrdom attractive: “The idea
of dying as a martyr provided a perfect escape from
the frightening anguish of eternal punishment.”54
Significantly, this individual emphasized the “idea
of dying as a martyr” over other potential motives.
Similarly, other testimonies place less stress on the
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image of Islam under assault, the presumed rallying cry
of many Salafist jihadis, than they do on a certain lust
for violence—as evidenced by the popularity of video
camera recordings of car bombings and other attacks.55
This emphasis suggests that an adolescent desiring to
act out violent fantasies may in part account for the
recent popularity of some forms of jihadism, with the
rallying cry merely providing social justification for
other destructive impulses.56 Still other scholars point
out that the motives for some terrorists are rooted in
small-group dynamics rather than lofty ideological
aims, while admitting that a vague vision of creating a
Salafi state does seem to hold al-Qaeda and some of its
emergent offshoots together.57 Yet other scholars warn
that economic, social, political, and cultural conditions
cannot be ruled out.58 In any case, the point is that the
motives of leaders may well differ significantly from
those of the foot soldiers. Oversimplifying the problem
is, thus, likely to lead to a flawed strategy.
Diverging Approaches?
There are two principal schools of thought on
how to approach the war of ideas. The first approach
advocates treating the conflict as a matter best addressed
through public diplomacy—defined as the conveyance
of information across a broad spectrum to include
cultural affairs and political action. Accordingly,
this view calls for revitalizing or transforming the
U.S. Department of State and many of the traditional
tools of statecraft.59 This school of thought contends,
and justly, that American public diplomacy declined
after the Cold War, as evidenced by the demise of the
U.S. Information Agency in 1999, and the reduction
or elimination of strategic communications programs
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such as “Voice of America,” and Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty. The remedy, then, according to this view,
is to re-engage the world, especially the Arab-Muslim
world, by revitalizing both the form and content of U.S.
public diplomacy and strategic communications, and
by reinforcing those communications with concrete
programs that invest in people, create opportunities
for positive exchanges, and help build friendships. In
fact, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and its Iraqi
component, Radio Free Iraq, and Al-Hurra TV are now
actively participating in U.S. strategic communication
efforts, though with debatable effectiveness; all this
has occurred, in part, by taking resources from Voice
of America.60
Some experts characterize this approach as
attempting to win the “hearts and minds of Muslims
worldwide.”61 However, this characterization is
counterproductive, implying that the United States
is trying to convert Muslims. That apprehension, in
turn, plays into the hands of violent extremists who
claim their religion and way of life are under attack.
Simply put, this approach is an advertising campaign,
though it strives to be more than that by promoting
real investments in people and in genuine cultural
exchanges, such as the revival of the Fulbright
Scholarship Program and the creation of the Global
Cultural Initiative.62 The objective of this advertising
campaign is to “sell” America rather than to convert
others, though there is a fine line between convincing
people to “buy” into an idea, and converting them. This
approach is also an important attempt to employ more
than military tools in the war on terror. As officials and
analysts have repeatedly noted, “soft” power matters.63
Yet, it seems the means for employing soft power are
inadequate.
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In direct contrast, the second school of thought
advocates treating the war of ideas as a “real war,”
wherein the objective is to destroy the influence
and credibility of the opposing ideology, to include
neutralizing its chief proponents.64 This approach sees
public diplomacy as an essential, but insufficient tool
because it requires too much time to achieve desired
results, and does little to aid the immediate efforts of
combat forces in the field. For this school of thought,
the principal focus of the war of ideas ought to be how
to use the ways and means of information warfare to
eliminate terrorist groups. In the words of one advocate
of this view:
We seek an unashamedly offensive strategy to take and
hold the initiative in the war of ideas. This information
offensive is fought not as one would conduct diplomacy,
but as one would wage true warfare: a political and psychological strategy not just to undermine the enemy but
to help our diplomats and combat forces destroy it.65

It is worth reiterating that this view does not consider
the former school’s emphasis on public diplomacy
to be wrong, only too limited in terms of the tools it
employs and too passive in nature. Instead, this view
maintains that what is needed is an acknowledgment
that the war of ideas is a genuine and serious war with
considerable stakes, and that winning it requires much
more than the restoration of public diplomacy, however
robust that restoration turns out to be. Second, it urges
that the United States and its friends and allies adopt
information strategies that are more aggressive. Such
strategies would use “words as weapons,” redefine
concepts in ways the enemy cannot exploit, “brand”
and “ridicule” the views of the foe, and “overwhelm
him with images and narratives too numerous to
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counter.”66 It especially stresses more extensive use of
information-age technologies, such as the internet, to
block or disrupt jihadist recruiting and propaganda
efforts.67 In short, this approach treats the war of ideas
as a classic ideological struggle, but wants to wage it
with newer information warfare tools and techniques,
combined with kinetic force where appropriate.
Indeed, substantial evidence supports this view.
As one American who has worked in information
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan recently
reported:
The [U.S.-led] coalition [in Iraq] has failed to counter
enemy propaganda either by responding rapidly with
effective counter messages or by proactively challenging
the messages, methods, and ideology that the insurgents
and extremists promote and exploit. . . . while the coalition fumbles its information operations, the insurgents
and militia groups are adept at releasing timely messages to undermine support for the Iraqi government and
bolster their own perceived potency. They are quick to
exploit coalition failures and excesses; they respond rapidly to defend their own actions, often by shifting blame
to the authorities; and they hijack coalition successes to
argue that change only occurs as a result of their violence. The slow speed of the U.S. military’s clearance
process—typically it takes 3 to 5 days to approve even a
simple information operations product such as a leaflet
or billboard—creates an information vacuum that Iraqis
fill with conspiracy theories and gossip often reflecting
the exaggerations or outright lies of insurgents and extremists.68

Extremists have also purportedly identified
influential columnists and academics “with email
addresses,” such as Thomas Friedman, Francis
Fukyama, and Samuel Huntington, as targets for their
public relations campaigns.69 The value of the internet
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has already been well-documented: websites and chat
rooms provide violent extremists with the necessary
grist to concoct moral and theological justifications
for their crimes, as well as the training and instruction
needed to execute them.70 Its use continues to expand,
fostered in part by young Muslims who appear to be
acting independently, as the result of inspiration rather
than direction.71
Their differences notwithstanding, these two
approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Much of the language in the new U.S. National Strategy for
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC)
supports both, though it is explicitly weighted toward
the former.72 The NSPDSC establishes three strategic
objectives for public diplomacy: (1) to offer a positive
vision of hope and opportunity rooted in “our most
basic values”; (2) to isolate and marginalize violent
extremists; and (3) to nurture common interests and
values between Americans and peoples of different
countries, cultures, and faiths across the world.73
Notably, the document offers two ways to accomplish
the second objective: (1) isolating and discrediting
terrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations; and (2)
delegitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achieve
political ends. Clearly, these ways, or methods, are in
alignment with the second approach.
Still, while these two approaches are not mutually
exclusive, they are not entirely compatible either.
They represent two different perspectives: the former
accords with the views of the U.S. Department of State,
which sees the main effort as the reshaping of the
image of the United States through “outreach.” The
second approach is in line with the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD), which sees the objective as the
actual elimination of a threatening ideology. This task,
according to one expert, “cannot be run out of the State
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Department,” since “diplomats by their purpose and
training are not warriors and should not be expected
to become warriors.”74 By the same logic, however,
it would seem that warriors, by their purpose and
training, are not well-suited to engage in outreach
with foreign cultures, aside from military-to-military
contacts. Yet, this is precisely the role in which they
often find themselves. So, the logic above does not
necessarily hold, even if the recommendation might.
Nor is it desirable to subordinate one department
to another in this case. Either the restoration of public
diplomacy will proceed too slowly, or the isolation
and neutralization of terrorist leaders will not occur
quickly enough. The solution recently recommended
by the Defense Science Board (2008), namely, creating a
“permanent strategic communication structure within
the White House,” has potential.75 However, some
caution is warranted as the U.S. strategic effort cannot
afford to add yet another layer of bureaucratic oversight
to a structure and a process that are already painfully
slow and reticent to act. The speed of information
in today’s strategic environment underscores the
need not only for rapid, decentralized responses, but
also for preemptive or anticipatory measures. The
State Department and DoD are organized more with
accountability than efficiency in mind. U.S. leadership
at all levels is answerable for its actions in ways that
its opponents are not; but, the need for accountability
fuels a tendency to exercise tighter control, especially
in fluid environments. That, in turn, works against
rapid responsiveness or preemption. Thus, the goal
of creating a permanent strategic communication
structure must be to facilitate White House leadership
and direction, rather than to add further impediments
to the flow of information.
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Moreover, neither department has sponsored a
concerted effort to understand wars of ideas as such.
While, as we have said, the State Department endeavors
to change the U.S. image from malevolent to benevolent,
such efforts ought to occur whether or not the United
States is involved in a war. They should, in fact, never
end. Opinions are fleeting things requiring constant
cultivation.76 As one expert testified: “U.S. earthquake
relief efforts doubled the percentage of Pakistanis
with favorable views of the U.S. from 23 percent to 46
percent from May 2005 to November 2005. This figure
had dropped to 27 percent by 2006, however.”77 Also,
as the “Cola Wars” illustrate, advertising campaigns
should expect to run indefinitely. The goal is not just
that consumers should drink Coke instead of Pepsi or
another brand, but that they should drink it regularly.
Campaign efforts must persist because when they fail
to do so, they give rise to uncomfortable questions
about a product’s long-term viability.
While proponents of the second approach see the
war of ideas as an ideological struggle, they do not
address how to avoid inflicting “collateral” damage on
Islam as a religion and a way of life. By comparison,
the possibility of inflicting collateral damage on the
ideology of socialism was hardly a concern during
the Cold War. An aggressive campaign to debase and
delegitimize al- Qaeda leaders and their ideas must
avoid inadvertently striking core religious or cultural
values, which might in turn lend credence to the claim
that the West is attacking Islam. The violent reaction to
the cartoons that appeared in the Danish newspaper,
Jyllands-Posten, in September 2005, shows that extremists will move quickly and ruthlessly to exploit certain
messages and images, regardless of their content or
the author’s intent. The problem is that information
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warfare is not as precise as conventional wisdom
would have us believe. The many and various tools of
the information age almost guarantee that words and
images are, at best, only blunt instruments. The ways
in which information can be spun have multiplied
considerably, thereby increasing the “damage radius”
of words and ideas.
The second approach rightly sees the war of ideas
as a clash of opposing wills. However, this clash is
not simply binary in nature. During the Cold War, it
was reasonable to expect that third parties would be
receptive to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO) strategic communications. That is not necessarily the case today. As mentioned previously, an
overwhelming majority of Muslims might not want to
join a Salafist global jihad; but they might find some
U.S. policies openly hostile, and might actively resist
U.S. communication efforts as a result. Accordingly,
U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must have a more
precise goal than improving America’s image: it must
continue to discourage young Muslims from joining
al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates. Winning a popularity
contest is far less important than undermining alQaeda’s ability to recruit. The two aims are eminently
separable, and conflating them only creates confusion.
Fortunately, the brutal methods of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates are helping Coalition efforts in the battle of
ideas. As recent polls have shown, support of suicide
bombing and other violent tactics is declining among
some Muslim populations; this drop off is partly due
to the extreme methods employed by al-Qaeda.78 Some
Sunni militias have distanced themselves from al-Qaeda
in Iraq, and groups of “Concerned Local Citizens”
(CLCs) have emerged not only to compete for resources
locally, but also to help combat al-Qaeda’s influence.79
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The hotel bombings in Amman motivated the Jordanian
government to take more aggressive action in its own
war against terror.80 Again, these developments have
occurred partly because of al-Qaeda’s ruthless use of
terror tactics against other Muslims. While al-Qaeda’s
propaganda paints the war on terror as a crusade
against Islam, and publishes images of coalition troops
being attacked, the reality is that far more Muslims
than non-Muslims have been killed and injured by its
violent tactics.81 That knowledge is becoming more
widespread; U.S. strategy should help spread it even
farther, and it should encourage peaceful political
activism as an alternative to violent extremism.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must be
more sensitive to the opportunities and pitfalls
introduced by physical events. The incidents at
Abu Ghraib, which were extremely harmful to
coalition efforts, would pale in comparison to a
premature withdrawal from Afghanistan or Iraq.
Indeed, bin Laden and other al- Qaeda leaders
have already purportedly declared victory in
Iraq based on their skewed interpretations of
U.S. opinion polls and of election campaign
rhetoric regarding troop withdrawals.82 Conversely, the successful stabilization of those
states would have an extremely positive effect
on the war of ideas, undercutting al- Qaeda’s
general information campaign. This is not to
say that U.S. forces must remain committed in
large numbers in both countries irrespective
of progress, or despite the emergence of other
strategic challenges. However, it does mean
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that winning the war of ideas will become much
more difficult, and the damage to America’s
image much more severe, if the withdrawal
of Coalition forces is perceived as premature.
To be sure, terrorists will attempt to spin any
Coalition withdrawal as a strategic failure,
regardless of the circumstances under which
it occurs. However, that spin will have greater
potential of backfiring if indigenous forces can
continue to provide effective security in the
wake of any departure of coalition troops.
• Neither the Department of State’s approach nor
that of DoD should be subordinated to the other.
Rather, the United States should pursue both
approaches in parallel. Public diplomacy efforts
should be expanded with the aim of restoring
America’s image, and that endeavor should
continue indefinitely, whether or not the United
States is at war. The State Department should also
expand and enhance its current communication
efforts with new methods and technologies. Some
analysts suggest that any tendency to control
the message too tightly is counterproductive
to U.S. communication efforts; they suggest an
“evolutionary” approach, modifying messages
and techniques as the situation dictates.83 This is
only one possible innovation; whether or not it
succeeds, the point is that the United States can
explore different messages and techniques with
minimal risk in most cases.
• Concurrently, DoD should concentrate its efforts
on defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates militarily.
Admittedly, terrorist organizations can change
their names, but that, too, is a victory of sorts.
Moreover, even with altered names, many of
the key network nodes and links will remain
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operative, thus allowing for the finessing of those
organizations. In any case, this tighter focus
would help establish some parameters for the
war of ideas; it would also facilitate the isolation
and neutralization of al-Qaeda leaders, as well
as lend some clarity to America’s larger strategic
intentions. To that end, DoD organizations
should receive resources commensurate with
the mission of prosecuting the war of ideas as
a war. The number of religious and cultural
experts available to the Deputy Directorate
for the War on Terrorism (DDWOT/J-5), for
instance, should be increased.
• DoD should also sponsor a series of studies and
conferences exploring wars of ideas farther so
as to promote a better understanding of their
principal types and range of outcomes. If recent
wars are any indication, the U.S. military will
encounter similar information operations in
future conflicts. In many respects, this war is
a testing ground for a host of rapidly evolving
information-age tools and techniques. However,
the lessons gleaned from this conflict will be
incomplete if they are not also accompanied
with a better appreciation of wars of ideas as a
mode of conflict.
• Armed with this knowledge, the U.S. military
must consider revising its corpus of doctrine
pertaining to information operations. Joint
doctrine is reasonably comprehensive in terms
of addressing information operations, to include
sub- and related categories such as psychological
operations and military deception.84 However,
the chief assumption underpinning each of
these documents is that information operations
support (kinetic) military operations. That is
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true in many types of conflicts. However, in
other cases, particularly the current war of ideas,
this relationship is reversed: military operations
need to support information operations. AlQaeda and other jihadi organizations are not
fighting a new kind of war, but instead are
subordinating their military operations to a
well-crafted information campaign designed
to exploit certain cultural and religious values.
All Joint and service publications pertaining
to information operations should be revised
to incorporate those wars where military
operations are conducted in support of a larger
information campaign. Put differently, U.S.
military doctrine must broaden its view of the
relationship between kinetic and information
operations.
• Furthermore, doctrine concerning information
operations must be revised to reflect the reality
that the “information environment” is neither
neutral nor static. Disparate cultural and social
influences almost ensure that diverse audiences
will interpret the same information differently.
Even within that variegated landscape, the
meanings of images, concepts, and visions are
often bitterly contested. It is almost impossible
to interpret information objectively because the
very tools needed for interpretation in the first
place are derived from subjective experiences
and structures of meaning. In many cases,
enough commonalities exist to allow at least a
baseline of communication to take place. Yet,
an important assumption underpinning U.S.
doctrine on information operations is that all
audiences will essentially draw the desirable
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conclusion, if given enough of the “right”
information. This assumption overlooks how
various cultures assess information depending
on the sources. Simply put, “right” appears
differently to diverse audiences. While we
would expect our opponents to spin information
to their advantage, even so-called neutral
populations are not necessarily impartial when
it comes to interpreting information offered by
either side.
• The U.S. military already understands, at
least in theory, that successful information
operations require a working understanding
of target cultures. It needs more resources to
put theory into practice, however. For that
reason, the U.S. Army’s new Human Terrain
System (HTS) is an important step in the right
direction.85 The mission of the HTS is to provide
commanders information on local social groups
and their interests, beliefs, leaders, and on the
basic drivers of individual and group behaviors.
Clearly, this kind of information is invaluable
in stability operations and counterinsurgency
operations where interaction with the
indigenous population is both frequent and
vital. The most critical part of the system is the
Human Terrain Team (HTT), which consists
of five personnel: a team leader, two social
scientists, a research manager, and an analyst.
A preliminary assessment of the contributions
of an HTT in Afghanistan was positive.86 But,
more HTTs appear to be needed.
Assuming subsequent assessments of HTTs are
also positive, the Army should seriously consider
expanding the HTS and making it more robust.
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The HTS is one concrete way of putting useful
cultural and social information in the hands
of those at the sharp end. It also provides the
Army with a vehicle for optimizing the use of
personnel with valuable cultural knowledge and
language skills. Thus, the Army should consider
increasing the number of HTTs to perhaps as
many as one per battalion, and placing a general
officer in charge of the overall system to give it
more heft. Consideration should also be given
to placing them at combatant command level to
assist in the development of security cooperation
plans. Personnel assignment and assessment
policies will also have to be aligned to reward
leaders appropriately, and to help grow officers
and noncommissioned officers with relevant
cultural knowledge and other expertise. To be
sure, supplying enough qualified personnel to
meet the demand will remain a major challenge.
Nonetheless, recent successes in Afghanistan
and Iraq suggest that taking such measures will
pay important dividends in future conflicts.
As we have seen, wars of ideas, regardless of type,
are often serious matters. The stakes can run quite
high, and the consequences of failure can be severe,
regardless of how little shooting is involved. Just as
ideas require carriers or vectors, so wars of ideas turn
on physical events. Our approach to such wars must
always take that into account. By understanding wars
of ideas as a mode of conflict, we can fight the current
battle of ideas more effectively, while at the same time
better preparing ourselves to wage future ones. We
have much more to learn about such conflicts than this
brief survey can capture. One point is clear: our efforts
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to understand wars of ideas must rival our endeavors to
grasp other forms of conflict; otherwise our knowledge
of warfare will remain regrettably incomplete.
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